The End of an Orbán Era or Its Transformation?
On Sunday, Hungarians faced some of the most important parliamentary elections of recent years — decisive elections marked by a tense ambivalence between nationhood, tradition, the values of the nation-state, and what has repeatedly been referred to as the “Brussels consensus.”
The Brussels consensus, dear readers, represents an informal alignment of the political class in European Union member states around a common set of policies and acceptable boundaries defined at the European level — an alignment that tends to soften genuine ideological competition and constrain national decision-making autonomy.
However, for reasons of nuance, the Hungarian elections cannot be fully placed within the paradox of this consensus, reasons to be elaborated on later.
Viktor Orbán thus brings to an end his 16-year dominance over the Hungarian political landscape. The emphasis on Orbán is deliberate, as the governing party, Fidesz, will continue its struggle from the opposition benches. This is not Fidesz’s first electoral defeat, but it is a particularly painful one after 16 consecutive years of political dominance.
For this reason, Fidesz will remain an important political force on the Hungarian stage, though not with Orbán at the helm, or at least not with him serving as prime minister. The party can be understood as a quasi-eternal force, a cyclical political movement that repeatedly returns to prominence. This was the case after the defeats of 2002 and 2006, and will most likely be the case after 2026 as well.
However, it is difficult to envision Fidesz, through the person of Viktor Orbán, leading Hungary again. Orbán himself has announced a period of party restructuring. It is not yet clear whether he will remain leader of the formation, but it is evident that, in the next elections, a reformed Fidesz will put forward a new candidate for prime minister in four years’ time.
Viktor Orbán is often regarded as a leading figure of European nationalism and the sovereigntist-conservative movement, a “Trump before Trump.” Of course, this does not signal a collapse of the sovereigntist and conservative movement in Europe, which continues to grow and could, in time, become a defining force in European politics.
Polling data across Europe shows that right-wing conservative parties rank first in many countries. Orbán’s defeat is unlikely to have a deconstructive effect on these movements. The political trend is clear and will become even more defined as these movements gain power in national parliaments. Only then will it be possible to speak, in earnest, of a potential “age of patriots.”
Péter Magyar and the Politics of Transition
Returning to the election results, Hungarians delivered an overwhelming majority to the opposition Tisza Party, led by Péter Magyar, who, in just two years, has become the defining political phenomenon in Hungary. In this short span, he managed to place second in the European elections and first in the national parliamentary elections, securing a supermajority in the Hungarian Parliament.
The political phenomenon represented by Péter Magyar will not be examined here in depth. The following paragraphs should be understood strictly as interpretative analysis — not as absolute truths, but as a set of conclusions and working hypotheses.
The “Brussels consensus” was mentioned earlier. But is Péter Magyar a pawn imposed by Brussels within this framework? The evidence does not support such a conclusion.
Before drawing firm conclusions about the nature of his rise, whether the result of external influence or a domestic political construction, it is necessary to analyse the policies and narratives that will emerge in the period ahead. This caution is warranted in light of a theory that has circulated in recent days: that Magyar is, in fact, a “Trojan horse” placed by Viktor Orbán to maintain indirect control over power.
In recent years, it had become increasingly credible that Orbán would, at some point, lose power in Hungary — a loss that appeared more likely to unfold gradually rather than abruptly, as has now occurred. After 16 years, the erosion of credibility and political capital is both inevitable and, to some extent, natural.
Yet a question arises: is this defeat the result of strategic anticipation by the Budapest establishment? Is Péter Magyar, to some degree, a product of this very system? The issue, then, is whether he is a fully autonomous political actor or whether his rise should be understood within broader mechanisms of political power reconfiguration. The available evidence suggests that he cannot be classified either as an “external pawn” or as a completely spontaneous outsider, but rather occupies an intermediate space characteristic of accelerated political transitions.
The New European Fault Line
Why might such a scenario be possible?
First, Magyar is not fundamentally different from Viktor Orbán in terms of background and formation. He is a Fidesz dissident who spent years in proximity to the circles of power in Budapest, including through his former wife, Judit Varga.
Second, in a broader sense, he is a direct product of this system, including through his academic formation at Pázmány Péter Catholic University, a prestigious institution regarded as a genuine breeding ground for elites.
These elements do not confirm the theory, but they do make it, at the very least, worthy of consideration.
The scenario that enabled Péter Magyar’s emergence took shape with the pardon scandal involving Katalin Novák, an action that alarmed a large segment of the population. That was the moment of Magyar’s emergence.
Both Katalin Novák and Judit Varga exited the political stage under intense pressure and can be interpreted as figures who absorbed the political cost of that episode, effectively “sacrificial” figures.
Subsequently, Péter Magyar appeared with the now-famous recording in which his former wife speaks about the state of power in Budapest. Much can be said about the moral dimension of his political rise. Yet the question remains: does anyone truly believe that a political insider could achieve such a rapid ascent without at least the tacit consent of influential structures within the state?
In reality, as early as the previous elections, the system built by Fidesz was already showing signs of weakness. Viktor Orbán had politically aged, and the prospect of his withdrawal was becoming inevitable. In this context, I believe Péter Magyar was “constructed” as a transitional solution: he emerged, played the role of the dissatisfied dissident, and created the impression of a rupture with Orbán.
This scenario is not new in politics. It can be described as “political theater.” The difference, however, is that in the confrontation with the globalist elite in Brussels, it appears to be a far more coherent and carefully articulated plan.
If the scenarios advanced by those who support this hypothesis prove accurate, then the power structure in Budapest has played its hand with remarkable efficiency. At the same time, it is plausible that the Brussels elite also played a role in this equation. It was evident that the Hungarian elections carried a geopolitical stake beyond being merely an internal political contest.
From Brussels’ perspective, there was a need for “an Orbán to replace Orbán.”
Continuity Disguised as Change in Budapest
It remains to be seen how long this illusion will persist, because following his victory, Péter Magyar’s narrative is strikingly similar to that of Viktor Orbán: strict border control, emphasis on patriotism and national identity, continuity of a mixed economic model, lifting sanctions against Russia, and reservations regarding Ukraine’s accelerated accession to the European Union.
This suggests that Péter Magyar, like Orbán, is a committed conservative and nationalist. If this hypothesis proves correct, then Orbán’s strategy may be regarded as highly effective.
Moreover, in the composition of the new Hungarian legislature, there is no left-wing party present; all formations range from conservative and nationalist to the radical right.
The European Commission appears to have anticipated this risk, which is why it may accelerate proposals to eliminate the veto right in foreign policy matters. Hungarian nationalism, regardless of the leader representing it, remains a direct challenge to the Brussels consensus.
Naturally, changes will occur in Budapest, some cosmetic, others substantive. Yet in essence, the political agenda will largely remain the same. In my view, we are witnessing a new phase of Orbán’s vision, a new move on the political chessboard.
Even if Viktor Orbán’s domestic political career may have come to an end, his influence may continue at the European level.
This interpretation may sound speculative, but the matter invites closer consideration. Even the details of election night - the indoor setting, the absence of Hungarian flags, Orbán’s relaxed attire, and his early concession - suggest a scenario that may have been anticipated rather than imposed.
For this reason, Brussels appears to have entered a new phase, characterized by a rhetoric of compromise. Many European leaders have moved into this zone of balance. A relevant example is Giorgia Meloni.
It remains to be seen whether Péter Magyar will keep Hungary outside the Brussels consensus or steer it toward a new form of European alignment.
