Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Post-War State Locked in Stasis

A Country Trapped in Political and Social Limbo

I was born and raised in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country often idealized in Western political discourse as a rare post-conflict success story. But my experience tells a very different story.

Bosnia is not the beacon of multiethnic democracy it’s portrayed as. It is fractured, stagnant, and increasingly volatile. For many outside observers relying on diplomatic briefings or NGO reports, the truth is obscured: Bosnia exists in limbo — geographically Balkan, politically a foreign protectorate, and culturally drifting further from Europe with each passing year.

This reality is most evident in its governance. Real power does not rest with elected leaders but with a foreign-appointed High Representative, wielding extraordinary “Bonn Powers”, a holdover from imperial-style mandates rather than modern diplomacy. This arrangement undermines any real claim to Bosnian sovereignty. The constitutional framework, born from the Dayton Agreement that ended the war, remains frozen in time, designed to halt conflict, not build lasting peace or progress. The result is a dysfunctional maze of overlapping institutions, paralyzed by ethnic vetoes that block meaningful reform.

From my perspective, Bosnia today is less a sovereign state and more an international project kept on life support - its fate shaped not by its citizens but by foreign diplomats and donor conferences. It remains trapped between a troubled past and a future slipping further away with each passing day.

The Stark Reality Behind Bosnia’s “Development”

Bosnia’s international image on development is equally misleading. The recent UNDP Human Development Index classifies the country as “highly developed,” a claim that falls apart under even the briefest scrutiny. While the indicators suggest progress, they mask the deep dysfunction shaping everyday life.

Take the health sector: it is crumbling. Patients often must buy even basic medical supplies themselves, like anaesthetics for routine procedures. On one occasion, I was told to purchase an entire box of local anaesthesia at a pharmacy for a minor treatment in a public hospital. Only one or two vials were used; the rest quietly kept by the attending physician. There was no accountability, nor any sense this was abnormal. In Bosnia, informal appropriation of public resources is not scandalous but simply how the system works.

This incident is not isolated. It is emblematic of widespread corruption and nepotism. Young professionals, largely unemployed, flee en masse not just due to lack of opportunity, but because meritocracy is absent. The education system is politically segregated and ideologically regressive, preparing generations not for the European labor market but for low-skilled clerical jobs abroad or submission to local party patronage.

Infrastructure crumbles, the rule of law remains a distant dream, and public services are pervasively negligent. During my last visit to a municipal office, an employee smoked in a basement room, ignoring a clear “no smoking” sign at the entrance, and handed over my requested documents with the dramatic reluctance of someone being asked to donate a kidney, not do their job. That image, to me, perfectly captures the contradiction of Bosnia’s “highly developed” label.

Fragmented Identities: Bosniak, Serb, and Croat Divides

While these fractures are visible on the surface and shape everyday life, beneath the societal currents Bosnia’s three constituent peoples - Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats - have not reconciled. Instead, they have retreated deeper into mutually exclusive interpretations of the past and incompatible visions for their futures.

Among Bosniaks, the largest group, political discourse has shifted in a deeply concerning direction. What was once a secular, civic-minded identity has become increasingly intertwined with Islamic revivalism and unsettling external alliances. The frequent veneration of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, alongside support for Iran’s theocratic regime and, in some cases, public endorsements of militant groups such as Hamas, has moved beyond the margins into mainstream political culture. Antisemitic motifs, often cloaked as anti-Zionist sentiment, circulate widely, accompanied by reflexive hostility toward the West. Open support for groups like Hamas and the Houthis signals a deeper ideological realignment, with affinities leaning more toward Tehran and Gaza than Brussels or Vienna. This shift is not accidental but symptomatic of a growing estrangement from Western institutions, fueled by a persistent sense of marginalization in the European integration process.

The Bosniak notion of a “građanska država” (civic state) may resonate positively with Western ideals at first glance. However, in practice, it often conceals a revanchist impulse, aiming to re-establish Bosniak political dominance and revisit unresolved grievances against Serbs and Croats. The legacy of the 1990s, rather than being overcome, has been absorbed into a political consciousness shaped more by retribution than reconciliation.

Serbs in Bosnia have largely abandoned even the pretense of loyalty to the central state. The Republika Srpska entity, under the leadership of Milorad Dodik, who is ideologically aligned with Vladimir Putin, openly flirts with secession. Dodik’s rhetoric and actions are calculated moves, betting on a fractured and indifferent West incapable of enforcing Bosnia’s unity. This gamble has largely paid off. Despite being convicted under state law, Dodik remains in power, shielded by institutional paralysis and his control over Republika Srpska’s entity police, which act more as his personal security than neutral law enforcement. His impunity reflects the systemic collapse of Bosnia’s governance. For many Serbs in Banja Luka, Sarajevo is not just distant, it is irrelevant. Bosnia itself is seen as an externally imposed inconvenience, sustained by legal fictions and empty state rituals.

Croats, meanwhile, have been systematically reduced to a politically neutered minority. Once a cornerstone of the post-Dayton balance, they face marginalization through demographic decline, institutional neglect, and legal distortions. This is most starkly illustrated by the repeated election of Željko Komšić as the Croat member of the state presidency, despite his rejection by the Croat electorate and overwhelming support from Bosniaks. Far from an anomaly, this practice violates the Dayton Agreement’s principle of constituent equality, openly repudiating the political legitimacy of Croats in Bosnia. The message is clear: Croats are no longer equal partners in governance but a diminishing minority tolerated and gradually absorbed into a Bosniak-dominated order that pays lip service to pluralism while undermining it in practice.

Bosnia’s Terminal Stagnation

What ties together Bosniak geopolitical wandering, Serb separatism, and Croat marginalization is the steady collapse of any common political language or shared vision.

Today, it is clearer than ever that Bosnia’s state apparatus is a hollow carcass, kept alive only by foreign aid and diplomatic inertia. The judiciary is fully politicized, the economy unsustainable, and public trust virtually nonexistent. Bosnia is simply not moving toward Europe. If anything, it is drifting irreversibly away. The population knows this all too well. Hence the mass emigration, widespread apathy, and deepening cynicism among young people who see no future in their homeland.

To continue pretending Bosnia will one day become a viable state is to participate in a devastating lie. Bosnia is not a country in transition, it is a country in terminal stagnation. The greatest injustice today lies not in its tragic past, but in the ongoing insistence that this fundamentally broken state structure must be preserved at all costs. This policy perpetuates dysfunction and denies future generations any prospect of normalcy.

Bosnia does not need more donor conferences or empty EU candidacies. It needs to be acknowledged, honestly and soberly, as a failure of both Western design and local complicity. The truth is harsh: this state will not heal, integrate, or modernize. Those oriented toward the West who have the means to leave should consider doing so. Those who remain must understand they live in a protectorate without a viable or dignified future. No loans, no foreign envoy, and no hollow declarations of “Euro-Atlantic integration” will ever change that.

The era of illusions must end before the next crisis begins, and rest assured, it will.

Damir Omerbegović

Writer | Commentator

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