Trump presents a daring strategy to reshape Gaza and bring an end to conflict.
Alexandra Tompson
Oct 29, 2025 - 2:33 PM
Share


Last month, Donald Trump unveiled a 20-point plan he claims could “finally bring peace” to Gaza and the broader Middle East. The proposal has reportedly drawn signals of support from Israel, the Palestinian Authority, several majority-Muslim states including Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, as well as key Western governments such as the UK, France, and Italy. But after a year of brutal war, the real question is: is this plan even viable?
The first goal is straightforward on paper: Gaza must become a terror-free zone. Hamas would be disarmed, armed factions dismantled, and military infrastructure like tunnels and weapons caches destroyed.
The problem? Deradicalization is far more complicated than destroying rockets. Gaza’s culture has been shaped by decades of indoctrination, glorification of martyrdom, and anti-Israeli sentiment. Overhauling schools and public messaging is a generational challenge. Demilitarization, too, is a multi-year endeavor. Verification, buybacks, and reintegration programs are essential but even optimists acknowledge the scale of the task.
Trump proposed an immediate ceasefire, with Hamas returning all hostages within 72 hours. Israel would then release 250 life-sentence prisoners plus ~ 1,700 detainees arrested after October 7, 2023. For every Israeli body returned, Israel would release 15 Palestinian remains. Hamas fighters who disarm and agree to peaceful coexistence could receive amnesty or safe passage abroad.
Since the plan’s release on September 30, the ceasefire has already proven fragile. Late October saw Israeli air strikes kill over 100 Palestinians after Hamas allegedly violated the truce by withholding remains of hostages. While the ceasefire was reportedly restored, this highlights just how tenuous the first steps of the plan are, which rely heavily on stable conditions on the ground.
The plan promises a rapid humanitarian surge: water, electricity, hospitals, roads, bakeries, and rubble removal, with aid flowing through the UN, Red Crescent, and vetted NGOs, while Rafah’s border crossing would be closely monitored.
History, however, gives reason for caution. Aid logistics in Gaza have repeatedly buckled under insecurity, theft, and the sheer scale of destruction. Even with a ceasefire, delivering supplies safely to all areas will be slow and difficult. Egypt remains wary of large population movements into Sinai, reflecting broader regional concerns about instability.
Funding is another critical question the plan only partially addresses. Gulf states, particularly the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, are expected to lead reconstruction financing, with European countries potentially contributing. The United States, while chairing the “Board of Peace” and overseeing the process, has not pledged direct funding for Gaza’s rebuilding. Even with generous contributions, rebuilding a territory devastated by years of war will cost billions and take decades. The plan’s vision of a “Dubai-style” economic recovery assumes a level of investment, governance, and political stability that may not materialize. Europe’s involvement is especially contentious, as many argue Gaza’s reconstruction is fundamentally a Middle Eastern issue. Without committed funding and effective coordination, the economic promises risk remaining aspirational rather than actionable.
The plan further imagines special economic zones and private investment to create wealth and jobs, hoping to reduce radicalism and foster peace. In reality, Gaza is not Abu Dhabi or Dubai. The social and political context is far more complex, and reconstruction will likely take decades, not years.
A temporary technocratic Palestinian committee would manage Gaza, overseen by an international “Board of Peace” chaired by Trump. Only after PA reforms, ending pay-for-slay programs, disbanding militias, and tackling corruption, would authority return to local control.
The legitimacy of unelected governance is a major hurdle. Gazans may resist oversight by foreign powers, and the PA’s long history of failed reforms raises further doubts. Add Hamas’s entrenched influence and mistrust of the U.S., and the practical implementation of governance reforms seems precarious.
Regional partners would guarantee compliance, and a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) would train Palestinian police and secure borders. The IDF would withdraw progressively once benchmarks are met.
But the ISF’s composition remains unclear, and it is uncertain how regional actors would enforce guarantees if Hamas fails to comply. The renewed violence in late October underscores the fragility of these arrangements.
Finally, Trump promises that successful redevelopment and PA reform could eventually lead to Palestinian self-determination. Yet democratic elections could easily return Hamas or a successor group to power, potentially undoing years of work. And in Israel, the appetite for a two-state solution has all but disappeared since October 7.
The 20-point plan is comprehensive, touching on security, governance, aid, and economic development. But the challenges are enormous. Ideology cannot be undone overnight. Governance reforms may fail. Regional guarantees may be symbolic. And both Israelis and Palestinians are exhausted, deeply mistrustful, and enraged after years of brutal conflict.
Recent events particularly the fragile ceasefire, renewed Israeli strikes, and the ambiguous response from Hamas, highlight that even the best-laid plans may unravel before implementation. Real peace will require unprecedented coordination, enforcement, and trust, none of which can be guaranteed at this moment.
The plan offers a vision but visions do not always translate into reality. One thing is clear: the preconditions of peace, hostage returns, Hamas disarmament, and reconstruction, are already under severe strain. Whether Trump’s plan will mark a turning point or join the long list of failed Middle East peace efforts remains to be seen.
Share
Alexandra Tompson
Editor | Lawyer (Admitted in New York; England & Wales)