Gang Violence in the Western Cape: Why Provincial Power is the Key to Change

Violence

The Cape Flats echo with gunfire, a chilling testament to a crisis spiralling out of control. Ian Cameron, head of the parliamentary police oversight committee, reported on social media that over five days in early 2025 at least 58 people were shot, 32 fatally - a snapshot of the gang violence plaguing the Western Cape.

This violence devastates communities socially, psychologically, and economically yet, as Cameron notes, the South African Police Service (SAPS) and its Anti-Gang Unit (AGU) is “crippled” by underfunding and neglect. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) highlights a 53% national murder rate surge since 2012 with organised crime tightening its grip.

The escalation in violence ties not just to historical scars but to systemic corruption, inefficiency, and underperformance in SAPS - worsened by national Black Economic Empowerment policies and cadre deployment over the last decade.

Since 2019, the Western Cape’s pleas for devolved policing powers have been ignored. Immediate steps within current constraints can help, but true transformation demands provincial autonomy, pressure for which could build with a referendum on Cape Independence.

The Extent and Roots of Gang Violence

With over 100 gangs active, violence in the Western Cape is staggering. Cameron’s report of 58 shootings and 32 deaths in five days mirrors a broader trend: gang-related murders dominate in areas like Manenberg and Mitchells Plain. The most recent SAPS Third Quarter 2024/25 Crime Statistics report pegs the national murder rate at 44 per 100,000 per year, with Western Cape hotspots far worse. Over the past decade, this violence has spiked, doubling in some areas.

With the ANC led government’s policies and mismanagement laying a foundation of poverty and unemployment, the recent surge stems from SAPS’s collapse. As evidenced by a 2022 Corruption Watch report of gang infiltration into Western Cape SAPS leadership, systemic corruption leads to impunity while the ISS notes a 61% drop in murder detection rates from 31% to 12.4% since 2012 as understaffed detectives juggle unmanageable caseloads. Black Economic Empowerment policies and cadre deployment have bloated SAPS with loyalists over competent staff, per a 2021 Afrobarometer survey. Dysfunction between units such as the AGU and Crime Intelligence stymies efforts, with Cameron lamenting resources are “not there”. In the last three years, metro police and LEAP officers seized 2,500 illegal firearms provincially and yet shootings rose, signalling a justice system adrift. Gangs like the Hard Livings thrive not just on drugs but on SAPS’s failures.

Consequences of Gang Violence

The consequences are dire. Socially, communities fracture as siblings join rival gangs, families mourn, and distrust festers. The ISS warns of a “vicious cycle” where the failures of SAPS erode cooperation and fuel crime. Psychologically, Cape Flats children show PTSD rates rivalling conflict zones’ while adults live in fear.

Economically, the province suffers. The violence is a blight on the Mother City and the Western Cape which threatens tourism, a sector that contributes up to 3.5% of the local economy and 5% of local jobs. According to property trend reports, property values in gang-affected areas like Mitchells Plain have stagnated or declined relative to safer suburbs since 2015, with real estate trends showing slower growth in high-crime zones. Public resources buckle as SAPS’s R113.6 billion 2024 budget and health spending are sapped by gun injuries. Cameron’s “crippled” AGU mirrors a broader crisis: 180,000 SAPS personnel nationwide, yet gang power grows. In a vicious spiral, Corruption Watch cites a 2-3% conviction rate for gang crimes, letting shooters strike again. The drug trade, worth millions annually, fills economic voids SAPS can’t police and is often complicit in, together with poor policies. This isn’t mere crime, it is a systemic failure magnified over a decade.

What Can Be Done Right Now?

Within national limits, action is possible. Steps include:

Strengthen Existing Units: Reallocate R50 million from provincial discretionary funds to equip the AGU with vehicles, staff, and intel tools. The ISS backs targeted resources over mass hires.
Community Policing: Train 1,000 volunteers for neighbourhood watches in six months, leveraging Cameron’s “fight with what we have” and ISS coordination calls.
Youth Programs: Shift R20 million from education budgets to after-school programs in 20 gang-prone schools, cutting recruitment.
Intelligence-Based Policing: Prioritise SOCMINT, HUMINT, and OSINT to drive tactics and operations. Allocate R10 million provincially to boost AGU’s intelligence, monitoring gang-relevant social media (SOCMINT), cultivating informants (HUMINT), and scraping public data (OSINT). Integrate this with visible policing (e.g., hotspot patrols), analysis (e.g., mapping gang networks), investigations (e.g., targeting leaders), and prosecutors (e.g., sharing real-time intel). The ISS urges data-driven policing; its proposed centre of excellence could pilot here, tracking performance via arrests and firearm seizures. In 2023, SAPS’s Crime Intelligence floundered. Revamping it locally could disrupt 20% of gang operations in a year.
Legislative Push: Pressure national lawmakers with Western Cape’s 42 MPs:

Amend Criminal Procedure Act (CPA) Section 342A to limit postponements to two and Section 77 to presume against bail for gang firearm crimes.
Refine POCA to define gang offences and mandate 90-day trials, per ISS modernisation goals.
Propose a six-month emergency bill, piloted locally, to fast-track 500 gang cases yearly, aligning with ISS evidence-based policing.

These proposals harness provincial lobbying and budgets. The ISS notes SAPS’s 12.4% detection rate demands judicial speed; halving delays could deter violence. Corruption Watch’s 2-3% conviction rate underscores urgency. Expedited cases could jail repeat offenders.

Provincial influence can nudge, but not overhaul, this mess. Cameron’s AGU critique that “units don’t have what they need” matches ISS findings: a corrupt, fragmented SAPS with a crony-bloated leadership and crashing crime detection rate. Dysfunction between AGU, Crime Intelligence, and detectives highlighted by Corruption Watch’s gang infiltration evidence, stymies efforts. The SAPS Act’s 1995 framework invites political interference.

Constraints and the Case for More Power

The Western Cape is paralysed because policing and justice are national, not provincial, domains.

Since 2019, devolution pleas have been rebuffed. With autonomy, the province could:

Amend CPA/POCA instantly, cutting delays 50%.
Triple AGU funding to R150 million, targeting gang kingpins.
Launch R500 million in youth jobs and urban renewal, sidestepping national red tape.

A Cape Independence referendum, with 50% public support, could force this shift. With provincial control, a proper blueprint, political will, and merit-based management which targets firearm crime and boosts investigations, efforts will shine.

Conclusion

It is clear that more provincial powers are needed. Yet, since 2019, devolution pleas have hit a wall. The vision is a police force targeting offenders, setting the foundation for efficient convictions in a supportive legal framework. Centralised rot continues to block any such hope. A referendum on Cape Independence, backed by half the public, could be the trigger to unlock swift justice, robust policing, and tailored renewal. Veneto and Scotland have shown the power of referendums to devolve powers.

The Western Cape can’t wait for Pretoria to shed its cadre-laden chains—it must act now and fight for the power to prevail.

Dr. Joan Swart

Chief of Staff of the Referendum Party | Military Expert

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