How Iran Turned the Houthis Into a Regional Power

The Rise of the Houthi-IRGC Axis

The Houthis, the Tehran-backed Zaidi group in Yemen that defeated the UAE and Saudi Arabia in the Yemeni civil war, are now threatening to target Israeli civilian aircraft.

The Houthis’ transformation from a local rebel group, often associated with drug use, into a regional player capable of threatening shipping lanes and launching rocket and drone attacks on Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates stems from their close relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

In April, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth warned Tehran in a tweet that Washington was fully aware of their “lethal support to the Houthis” and knew exactly what they were doing. Hegseth cautioned the Islamic regime in Tehran that it would “pay the consequence at the time and place of” Washington’s choosing. Although the U.S. has not yet chosen when or where to respond, the Revolutionary Guard–Houthi axis rests on five key pillars.

The Five Pillars of Support

First, the financial lifeblood provided by the IRGC is indispensable to the Houthis. This support includes direct financial handouts that enable the Houthis to sustain governance and military operations in the territories they control. More importantly, the IRGC has integrated the Houthis into its sophisticated global sanctions-busting networks. The U.S. Department of the Treasury has exposed these complex schemes, identifying individuals and entities involved in illicit oil sales and other financial mechanisms designed to circumvent sanctions and channel funds to the Houthis. This financial pipeline not only sustains the Houthi insurgency but also enriches the IRGC coffers, creating a symbiotic relationship that undermines regional stability.

Second, the IRGC’s provision of advanced weaponry has significantly enhanced the Houthis’ military capabilities. What began as a largely irregular fighting force now wields an arsenal that includes ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and increasingly sophisticated unmanned aerial vehicles. Numerous interdictions of arms shipments by U.S., British, and allied naval forces have uncovered weapons of Iranian origin and/or facilitated by the IRGC. United Nations expert panels have also documented Iranian-made components in Houthi weaponry, if not entire Iranian systems such as Shahed drones. This flow of arms, including anti-ship missiles recently used to threaten Red Sea shipping, violates UN Security Council resolutions and directly implicates Tehran in the violence emanating from Yemen.

Third, the IRGC’s involvement extends beyond arms supply to include training and operational guidance. Intelligence reports have long confirmed the presence of IRGC and allied Lebanese Hezbollah operatives on the ground in Yemen. These personnel are more than mere advisors; they actively train Houthi fighters in advanced combat tactics, drone operations, missile launches, and sophisticated guerrilla warfare. This hands-on mentorship has significantly enhanced the Houthis’ effectiveness and their ability to operate and maintain the advanced weapons systems provided by Iran.

Fourth, the Houthis are a key element of the IRGC’s broader “Axis of Resistance,” a network of proxy forces and militias spanning the Middle East. This network includes groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, various militias in Iraq and Syria, and Palestinian factions. It enables Iran to project power, destabilize adversaries, and entangle its rivals in costly conflicts without direct Iranian military involvement. The Houthis play a strategic role in this framework by opening a southern front against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and disrupting vital international shipping lanes. Their coordinated actions, shared rhetoric, and frequent synchronization suggest a central command and control structure influenced, if not directly overseen, by the IRGC.

Fifth, the IRGC, which holds significant, if not dominant, influence over Iran’s regional foreign policy, provides crucial diplomatic backing for the Houthis. While Iran officially endorses a political solution in Yemen, the IRGC’s actions ensure the Houthis remain intransigent, operating from a position of perceived strength despite their internationally unrecognized status. This unwavering support emboldens the Houthis to resist compromise and prolong the conflict, confident that their principal patron will defend their cause and shield them from international pressure.

Strategic Implications for U.S. Policy

Terrorist and extremist groups thrive when they are allowed to dominate a country and exploit its resources to consolidate power. The IRGC in Iran exemplifies this dynamic.

Originally established as a parallel force to Iran’s Royal Army following the 1979 Islamist revolution, the IRGC has evolved into the richest and most organized terrorist entity globally. Over time, it has sought to replicate this model in other countries, including Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. The Houthis’ rapid transformation from a local rebel faction into a significant regional actor underscores the effectiveness of this strategy.

For the United States, the lesson is unequivocal: failure to confront and dismantle such groups while they are still weak will result in severe consequences later, consequences that may arise at a time and place not chosen by Washington.

Saeed Ghasseminejad

Senior Advisor | Foundation for Defense of Democracies

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