A Peace Built on Fault Lines
To understand why Benjamin Netanyahu says Israel will taper off U.S. military aid within a decade, you first have to understand the precarious security architecture the Donald Trump administration is attempting to build across the Middle East, and why Jerusalem doubts it will hold.
Washington’s strategy rests on a simple assumption: the region has entered a frozen phase of conflict. By locking in temporary balances, brokering deals among adversaries, and reducing escalation, the U.S. hopes to stabilize the theater long enough to pivot strategic focus toward China. The “Board of Peace,” unveiled in Davos in January 2026, embodies that logic: freeze the map, prevent flare-ups, and move on. But the freeze looks brittle.
- Syria remains unstable despite integration agreements, with renewed clashes between regime forces and Kurdish units around Aleppo and Raqqa.
- Turkey has hardened into an openly pro-Hamas posture, with President Erdoğan’s government offering institutional backing while seeking a security role in Gaza.
- Saudi Arabia continues to demand Palestinian statehood as the price of normalization and recently co-hosted a two-state conference with France.
- Qatar shapes Arab public opinion through its media and diplomatic leverage.
- Most dangerously, Iran faces deep internal unrest: protests that erupted in December 2025 triggered a violent crackdown killing thousands, raising the prospect of regime instability that could ignite the region.
Each of these fault lines could unravel the balance. Together, they make any promise of durable calm look temporary. Netanyahu appears to be planning for what happens when that calm breaks.
The Aid Announcement
Against this backdrop, Netanyahu’s January 2026 interview signaling that Israel should “taper off the military aid within the next 10 years” takes on sharper meaning. With a $1 trillion economy, he argued, Israel should not remain dependent on foreign assistance. The subtext is both political and strategic.
Politically, the mood in Washington is changing. Bipartisan support for large foreign-aid packages is eroding. Trump has pushed burden-sharing and skepticism toward subsidies. Republicans such as Senator Lindsey Graham have even floated accelerating the end of aid so those billions can be redirected to the U.S. military.
Strategically, Netanyahu sees risk in dependency. If aid becomes conditional, tied to Gaza operations, settlement disputes, or congressional budget fights, Israel’s military planning could become hostage to American domestic politics. If Trump’s peace framework collapses, if Iran’s instability spills outward, if Turkey’s ambitions clash with Israel in Gaza, or if the Syrian front destabilizes the Golan, Israel cannot afford delays in weapons or approvals.
The existing aid model already looks dated. The 2016 U.S.–Israel Memorandum of Understanding, negotiated under Barack Obama, guarantees $38 billion over ten years through 2028 - $3.3 billion annually in Foreign Military Financing plus $500 million for missile defense, much of it spent inside the United States. It was built for an era when Washington wanted a dependable regional anchor without deploying troops.
As 2028 approaches, that rigidity clashes with reality. Washington wants leverage and conditionality. Israel wants flexibility and autonomy. The relationship is shifting from subsidy to transaction.
From Aid to Autonomy
While Washington debates, Israel is already acting. Senior defense officials have made clear that future cooperation should emphasize joint projects and co-production rather than cash transfers. As former military finance chief Gil Pinchas put it, partnership matters more than the net financial issue.
Operationally, Israel is pursuing independence on multiple tracks. Under the Blue and White Independence Program, Elbit Systems has been contracted to manufacture heavy aerial munitions previously sourced abroad. The IDF’s five-year “Hoshen” plan prioritizes AI, robotics, and autonomous systems to reduce reliance on foreign supply chains and emergency resupply.
The aim isn’t to weaken the alliance with the United States. It is to ensure that, in a crisis, Israel can fight immediately without waiting for congressional approval or overseas shipments. This is insurance, not divorce. If Turkish forces entrench themselves in Gaza, if Iranian proxies rearm amid regime chaos, or if Syrian instability spreads, Israel wants both the fiscal and operational freedom to respond alone.
The Case for Going It Alone
Could Europe fill any gap left by reduced American aid? Unlikely. Unlike Washington, the European Union wields influence primarily through trade and humanitarian funding, not weapons transfers. There is no EU equivalent to the U.S.–Israel MOU, only association agreements, research funding, and tightly conditioned aid corridors.
Europe also faces credibility problems. Internal Hamas documents reported in late 2025 suggest that EU-funded NGOs operating in Gaza were closely monitored and sometimes infiltrated by Hamas intermediaries acting as “guarantors,” raising concerns about diversion and oversight failures. The revelations triggered calls in Brussels for stricter vetting and threatened the EU’s standing as a reliable stability partner.
At the same time, key European states have hesitated to join Trump’s Board of Peace. France rejected participation outright over legal concerns about the board’s structure. Germany and Italy cited constitutional constraints. Yet each maintains regional interests - reconstruction contracts, diaspora politics, historical obligations - creating ambivalence rather than commitment.
From Jerusalem’s perspective, that uncertainty reinforces the logic of independence. Europe cannot provide hard-power backfill. American aid is no longer guaranteed. Therefore, reliance on either becomes risky.
Think tanks such as the Foundation for Defense of Democracies argue the future relationship should look less like charity and more like strategic investment - joint AI, cyber, and supply-chain production benefiting both sides. No more optics of subsidy. More co-production.
Preparing for the Thaw
Netanyahu’s phase-out is not a gesture of ingratitude. It is a hedge against uncertainty. Trump’s peace architecture may succeed. But if Iran implodes, if Turkey pushes deeper into Gaza, if Syria destabilizes further, or if Washington’s political winds turn inward, Israel doesn’t want its security dependent on someone else’s budget cycle.
So Jerusalem is planning for the worst while hoping for the best. By raising defense spending toward 6 percent of GDP and building domestic capacity now, Israel ensures that if the regional freeze thaws suddenly, it won’t be caught with empty arsenals and conditional allies. In a multipolar Middle East, self-reliance isn’t ideology. It’s insurance.
Dre Lapiello
Independent Researcher | Broker
