Koran Burning Conviction in the UK: Is Blasphemy Law Sneaking Back?
Kurdish-Armenian refugee has been convicted for burning the Quran in London protest — a ruling that risks reintroducing blasphemy laws by the back door and threatens free speech in the UK. Discover the legal battle redefining the limits of religious criticism and hate crime.
Dr. Frederick Attenborough
Jun 6, 2025 - 12:57 PM
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The Protest and the Man Behind It
A Kurdish-Armenian refugee who burned a copy of the Quran outside the Turkish Consulate in London has been convicted of a religiously aggravated public order offence, in a case that marks a significant step towards the return of de facto blasphemy laws in Britain.
FSU member Hamit Coskun, 50, was found guilty at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on Monday of using disorderly behaviour “within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress” under section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986. District Judge John McGarva also found that Coskun was “motivated at least in part by hostility towards members of a religious group”, meaning the offence was treated as religiously aggravated under section 31(1)(c) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
On 13 February, Coskun stood outside the Turkish Consulate, held aloft a burning copy of the Quran, and shouted phrases including “Islam is the religion of terrorists” and “the Quran is burning”. He had announced the protest in advance via social media and later described it as a deliberate political act, intended to highlight what he views as the spread of hardline Islam within his native Turkey under President Erdoǧan. This was not a gesture made lightly. Coskun fled Turkey after being imprisoned and tortured for his involvement in a Kurdish political party that was later banned by the state. His brother, also a political activist, was murdered in 1997.
Legal Reasoning Behind the Conviction
The legal reasoning behind his conviction raises troubling questions about the future of free speech protection in the UK.
Central to Judge McGarva’s ruling was the claim that Coskun’s behaviour was “disorderly” in law not simply because of what he said or did, but because of the reaction it provoked. “That the conduct was disorderly is no better illustrated than by the fact that it led to serious public disorder involving him being assaulted by two different people,” the judge wrote.
In other words, the fact that Coskun was attacked by a knife-wielding man was treated not only as a consequence of his protest, but as evidence of its criminality.
The judge’s other key finding concerned motivation. Coskun consistently maintained that he was protesting against Erdoǧan and his government’s increasing use of religion in public life, not Muslims as a group. But the court rejected that argument. “It is not possible to separate [Coskun’s] views about the religion from his views about its followers,” Judge McGarva concluded. “He has a deep-seated hatred of Islam and its followers… I am sure that his motivation was in part due to hostility towards Muslims.”
That finding of religious hostility triggered section 31 of the Crime and Disorder Act, upgrading the offence from public disorder to a religiously aggravated hate crime, and resulting in a sentencing uplift. It also blurred the crucial distinction between criticism of a belief system and hostility towards those who adhere to it.
This is the heart of the matter, and the danger of the precedent now set. If every protest against Islam is presumed to be a protest against Muslims then space for lawful criticism of that religion – or any religion – collapses.
Free Speech vs Hate Crime
During the trial, Coskun’s barrister, Katy Thorne KC, argued that the prosecution unlawfully interfered with his Article 10 right to freedom of expression. Political expression, she said, enjoys the highest level of protection, extending even to speech that is “offensive, shocking or disturbing”.
While the judge accepted that Coskun’s Article 10 rights were engaged and conducted a proportionality analysis, he ruled that the interference was justified. “The consequences of the defendant’s provocative behaviour were that serious public disorder did break out,” he wrote. “The Public Order Act does recognise the right of an individual to criticise religion in general,” he added, “and those criticisms could have easily been made in a less provocative way.”
This same notion of “provocation”, and the shifting of legal responsibility onto the protestor for how others react, was not confined to the judgment. During cross-examination, the prosecution questioned why Coskun had burned the entire Quran rather than only the passages he found objectionable.
They also suggested that if the protest was truly about Erdoǧan’s regime, Hamit should have made that clearer while being physically assaulted by a man shouting at him. At what point, exactly, does the Crown believe he should have launched into a politico-philosophical explanation – via a language he doesn’t speak – of the slow erosion of Kemalist secularism in the republic founded by Atatürk since the late 1980s? While he was being chased with a knife? Spat at? Or how about while he was being kicked on the ground?
Dangerous Precedent
The Free Speech Union (FSU), which jointly funded Coskun’s legal defence with the National Secular Society, has pledged to support his appeal. In a statement, FSU Director Lord Young said: “This is a dangerous precedent. It effectively creates a heckler’s veto by violence, and opens the door to the return of blasphemy law in all but name. We’re supporting Hamit not because we’re anti-Islam, but because no one should be compelled to observe the blasphemy codes of a faith they do not share. Free speech must include the freedom to criticise religion.”
Readers who wish to support Hamit’s appeal can donate here.
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Dr. Frederick Attenborough
Dr. Frederick Attenborough | Research Director of the Free Speech Union