The Information War

Alongside battlefield violence, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have fought to control the narrative, with propaganda and disinformation. The SAF has sought international backing by highlighting the RSF's widely documented atrocities — including systematic killings, sexual violence, ethnic targeting, torture, and other abuses. The Sudanese government has outlawed the RSF by designating it a terrorist organization. The Sudanese Foreign Ministry has explicitly accused the RSF of perpetuating genocide in the Fasher region of Sudan.

The SAF’s professed commitment to enforcing International Humanitarian Law (IHL) would carry greater credibility if not for the fact that the SAF has perpetrated serious abuses of its own and is eager to integrate former RSF leaders into its ranks. If the SAF were genuinely committed to upholding IHL, it would need to remove radical Islamist elements within its forces, prosecute perpetrators of violations both within and outside its ranks, and refrain from incorporating defectors from the RSF – which the SAF has accused of grave abuses – into the military establishment.

Founding RSF Commander Joins SAF

Among the most notable cases is that of Major General Al-Nour Guba (Al-Nour Al Qubba), an early architect of the RSF. Al-Nour al-Qubba, once one of the RSF’s most influential field commanders, played a central role in major Darfur campaigns. He participated in the siege of El Fasher, which took place between 2023-2025. A UN fact-finding mission concluded that the RSF committed killings and destruction with "genocidal intent" during the siege.

After the 2024 killing of RSF commander Ali Yaqoub Jibril, al-Qubba took a leading command role in the siege. El Fasher’s civilians endured starvation, medical collapse, and relentless shelling – conditions so severe that some residents survived on animal feed amid famine.

In 2026, al-Qubba defected to the SAF, which publicly welcomed him.

Keikal and Selective Accountability

A similar pattern emerged with Abu Aqla Keikal, a Sudanese militia leader who led the Sudan Shield Forces (SSF). In August 2023, he announced his defection to the RSF with the words:

"We announce our joining and pledging of allegiance to the Rapid Support Forces… in support of the revolution and in support of the rights of the marginalized."

Under Keikal’s command, the SSF alongside the RSF committed countless atrocities in Gezira State, including the killing of over 100 civilians in Wad al-Nura village in June 2024. Yet when Keikal switched allegiances again in October 2024 – this time rejoining the SAF – his return received enthusiastic celebration. Two months later, the army, helped by Keikal’s forces, recaptured Gezira State, and Keikal became a celebrated general in the SAF, retaining the same unchecked authority he enjoyed under the RSF.

Once again, the SAF embraced a senior militia leader accused of grave crimes. The episode demonstrates that the SAF’s commitment to IHL is applied selectively. Allegations of grave violations pose little obstacle so long as the perpetrators align themselves with the SAF’s military objectives. Rather than pursuing accountability, the SAF absorbed Keikal and the SSF into the military establishment, which granted them amnesty as part of its wider policy of rewarding defectors.

Defections as a Wartime Strategy

The SAF’s short-term gain from defections is real. First, they fracture the RSF’s base. Al Nour al-Qubba, a member of the Mahamid-Rizeigat clan that forms part of the RSF’s core Arab constituency, illustrates the strategic value of these defections for the SAF. The realignment of elements within this clan network could enable the SAF to open new frontlines in Darfur and deepen divisions within the RSF’s traditional support structure. 

Second, by absorbing commanders like Keikal and affiliated units such as the SSF, the SAF acquires additional forces willing to employ extreme violence in pursuit of military objectives. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has long relied on Islamist factions — including the U.S.-sanctioned Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood — to reinforce the army’s war effort. Now the SAF inherits the SSF and its history of atrocities and sexual violence.

The SAF has waged an effective information campaign positioning itself as the legitimate state actor confronting a lawless militia, and that campaign has found receptive audiences abroad. But every celebrated defection quietly corrodes that narrative. Al-Nour al-Qubba and Abu Aqla Keikal are responsible for sieges, massacres, and famine. Their public rehabilitation shows that SAF condemnations are merely the rhetoric of a group seeking international legitimacy.

For international partners who treat the SAF as a good-faith partner in post-war reconstruction, serious concerns should arise. Backing the SAF means endorsing a coalition built on the same atrocities for which the RSF is condemned. With the distinction between the two forces collapsing into mere rivalry devoid of righteousness, foreign support would do well to shift its focus to Sudan’s myriad civil parties seeking greater international backing.