The Invisible Chokepoint
As East and West start to eye strategic maritime passages, there is a distinct absence of attention to the Cape. But that cannot last forever.
Robert Duigan
“Control of the sea by maritime commerce and naval supremacy means predominant influence among the nations; it has been so in the past, and it will be so in the future.”
That insight is once again reshaping global strategy.
Following the Trump presidency, many perceived a U.S. retreat from assertive foreign policy and the liberal international order. Yet this narrative obscures a parallel development: Washington is rediscovering the strategic value of maritime chokepoints. The Federal Maritime Commission has begun assessing seven such passages - the Northern Sea Route, the English Channel, the Malacca Strait, the Singapore Strait, the Strait of Gibraltar, the Panama Canal, and the Suez Canal.
But this list contains a critical omission: the Cape of Good Hope. With the Suez Canal increasingly shaped by Eastern influence, ignoring the southern gateway is a strategic liability the West can ill afford.
China has been preparing for this era far longer than the United States. American strategists spent a decade distracted, first by the post-Cold War “responsibility to protect,” then by Russia after Obama’s “pivot to Asia”, while Beijing methodically built a maritime empire.
This was foreseeable. The Chinese Communist Party’s 2013 ideological directive, Document 9, openly rejected Western political norms. Yet many Western observers clung to the belief that economic growth would liberalize China. Instead, Beijing doubled down. Its 2019 Defence White Paper explicitly calls for protecting “strategic passages of importance.”
Today the People’s Liberation Army Navy, now surpassing 350 ships, dominates the South China Sea and projects into the Indian Ocean, frequently harassing regional vessels. But its ambitions extend far beyond Asia. In early 2025, a Chinese naval group, destroyer CNS Zunyi, frigate CNS Hengyang, and replenishment ship CNS Weishanhu, circumnavigated Australia, conducted live-fire drills in the Tasman Sea, and disrupted commercial flights. Australia and New Zealand protested mildly and did nothing.
Meanwhile, China has quietly laid economic foundations through port acquisitions and infrastructure investment. COSCO alone now controls 12.6% of global port capacity. China is ASEAN’s largest trading partner, with regional trade reaching $975 billion in 2022. It is increasingly interested in Arctic routes that could shorten east–west shipping by 20–30%.
The Maritime Silk Road
The “Maritime Silk Road,” the seaborne arm of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), integrates ports, industrial zones, and logistics corridors across 65 countries. By 2023, China had invested $200 billion in 42 ports, including Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Gwadar in Pakistan. BRI countries account for 62% of the world’s population and 31% of global GDP.
China’s military presence follows naturally. The Djibouti base hosts roughly 2,000 troops and anchors China’s anti-piracy operations, and, more importantly, its control of Red Sea trade routes.
The Gaza war has further destabilized Western maritime dominance. Iranian-aligned Houthi rebels have attacked shipping in the Red Sea while allowing Russian and Chinese vessels to transit freely. Egypt, whose Suez Canal handles 12–15% of global trade and 60% of China’s shipments to Europe, is drifting steadily into Beijing’s orbit. Its economic zone at Suez hosts over 180 Chinese firms, with investments exceeding $3 billion.
In January 2024, Houthi spokesperson Mohammed al-Bukhaiti told Izvestia that Russian and Chinese ships faced “no threat whatsoever.” The alignment is increasingly explicit.
Trump’s Strategy Behind the Theatrics
Trump’s public musings about annexing Greenland or “taking back” the Panama Canal were widely dismissed as unserious. But beneath the bluster lies a simple logic: secure maritime chokepoints, control global trade.
Trump’s negotiation style, often theatrical, sometimes chaotic, regularly masks a consistent focus on leverage. The famous Trump Tower–Tiffany & Co. dispute is illustrative: by presenting one elegant design and one intentionally hideous alternative, Trump induced acquiescence. Whether one admires or despises the approach, the method is clear: create pressure, then offer relief.
Seen in this light, America’s maritime recalibration is not incoherent. It nudges allies to assume greater responsibility for shared security. Europe hesitates; Japan accelerates. Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy embodies this shift. It secures shipping routes, counters Chinese expansion, and expands Japan’s global naval presence. Tokyo now deploys vessels from Southeast Asia to East Africa. The Red Sea crisis, when Houthis seized a Japanese-operated ship and U.S. support was limited, reinforced Japan’s belief that it must defend itself far beyond its home waters. The U.S., for its part, seems increasingly interested in encouraging such burden-sharing.
Unlike China and the U.S., Britain has not fully grasped the maritime moment. Once the world’s paramount naval power, the UK now suffers from a crisis of institutional competence, political distraction, and strategic drift. The Royal Navy has shrunk dramatically. By 2024 the fleet included only:
8 Type 23 frigates
6 Type 45 destroyers
Carriers that share spare parts and alternate readiness
Recruitment is failing: only 2,436 enlisted in 2024 out of a target of 4,060, with tens of thousands of applicants lost to administrative delays. Defence spending is rising, from 2.1% of GDP in 2023 to 2.3% in 2024, with 2.5% planned by 2030, but gaps remain severe. The Ministry of Defence faces a £3.9 billion equipment shortfall.
Meanwhile, political decisions often run counter to maritime logic. Plans to transfer the Chagos Islands to Mauritius undermine both local wishes and U.S. strategic needs. Proposals for British troops to fight alongside Ukraine risk overextending an already strained military. With fewer than 80,000 active personnel, talk of conscription is emerging. A wiser course would be to leverage Britain’s comparative advantage: maritime power, not continental entanglements.
Why The Cape of Good Hope Matters
If the West seeks to stabilize the global trade system, it must secure the chokepoints that sustain it. The Cape of Good Hope, despite lacking the narrowness of Malacca or Suez, functions as one. During the Red Sea crisis, daily transits around the Cape surged from 40 to 85 ships, a 75% increase. Ultra-large container vessels relied almost entirely on this route. But these ships largely bypass South African ports, which the World Bank ranks among the world’s least efficient. The Cape is a navigational and strategic challenge:
Rogue waves up to 34 meters
Persistent winds of 20–40 m/s
A safe corridor only 50–70 nautical miles wide
Over 3,000 shipwrecks since 1500
Hydrodynamic conditions ideal for submarine stealth
Local currents that degrade radar/sonar reliability by 20–30%
These same conditions make the Cape a valuable monitoring point. If South Africa were to align fully with Chinese strategic aims, as its ANC leadership increasingly does, the West would face a potential backdoor opening into the South Atlantic. Closing both Suez and the Cape would cripple Europe and Australia. South Africa already hosts:
A Chinese mining enclave in Limpopo
Talk of a future Chinese naval base
Yet the Western Cape, economically dynamic, pro-Western, and home to a growing independence movement, presents a strategic counterweight. South Africa’s weak port infrastructure also forces Pretoria to accept foreign assistance. The first state to modernize these ports gains long-term leverage.
A Maritime Strategy for a New Era
A coherent Western maritime strategy requires:
Recognizing the Cape of Good Hope as a strategic chokepoint
Strengthening British and allied presence in the South Atlantic
Leveraging Western Cape autonomy and port reconstruction opportunities
Integrating the Cape into a wider Indo-Pacific and Atlantic security architecture
Sea power once defined the rise of nations. It still does. And unless the West rediscovers Mahan’s insight, that the control of global trade is inseparable from control of the sea, it risks ceding the future to those who have already understood it.
Robert Duigan
Editor | Political Analyst
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The Invisible Chokepoint | Visegrad24
