The Democratic Party has won both the House and the Senate, delivering a striking electoral defeat to the Republicans and the Trump administration. Democratic gains reached districts and states Trump carried comfortably in 2024. Whatever arguments follow about candidates, turnout and campaign strategy, the result is a rebuke to the party in power.

But a Republican defeat does not mean the political end of Donald Trump. The next two years will test whether he can respond to voters’ dissatisfaction or turn confrontation with Congress into an advantage for his party.

Everyone’s Fault but Trump’s

It was hardly surprising that Trump declined to accept much responsibility. He blamed Fox News for giving airtime to Democrats. His own explanation was: “I wasn’t on the ballot and if I was, we would have won IN A LANDSLIDE!” 

That defence avoids the obvious problem. A president does not need to appear on the ballot for voters to judge his administration. Republicans campaigned under the leadership of a man who has made himself inseparable from the party. He cannot reasonably claim its victories while treating its defeats as someone else’s responsibility.

In 2024, Trump and the Republicans capitalised on dissatisfaction with the Biden administration, its economic record, what conservatives regarded as a radical woke agenda, and its foreign policy failures. Many voters expected a change in direction. Nearly two years later, the question is whether the administration has delivered the improvements they expected.

The Price of America First

The economy offers an uncomfortable answer. CBS exit polls put Trump’s approval at 38 per cent and identified living costs as important to roughly nine in ten voters. Republicans cannot dismiss that dissatisfaction as a messaging failure. An administration elected partly on promises of greater prosperity must expect to be judged by what households can afford.

The war in Iran has added another difficulty. Reuters identified frustration over the conflict and its contribution to higher living costs among the forces behind the Republican losses. Americans are feeling the consequences of a foreign policy that looks different from the restraint many understood Trump to have promised. investing.com

The 2026 National Defense Strategy helps explain the administration’s priorities. It emphasises defending the homeland, protecting American interests in the Western Hemisphere, deterring China and requiring allies to assume greater responsibility for their defence. America First, in this formulation, is a doctrine of strategic power as well as a domestic political promise.

There is nothing inherently inconsistent about defending national interests abroad. The difficulty comes when an administration elected on criticism of previous interventions must explain why its own military commitments are different. Voters are entitled to ask whether America First has produced a more disciplined foreign policy or simply a different justification for intervention.

The continental United States may be geographically distant from foreign battlefields, but the economic effects of war do not stop at its borders. Energy costs, disrupted trade and uncertainty reach American households, just as they reach Europe and other economies. Strategic arguments offer little reassurance to someone struggling with ordinary bills.

Against that background, Trump’s attention to Washington’s appearance seems badly misplaced. He devoted his first public event after the Republican defeat to the White House ballroom, having used his final campaign speech to discuss renovations to the Lincoln Memorial Reflecting Pool.

I am no longer a diehard Trump supporter, but even those who remain loyal should recognise the problem. Architectural projects and personal branding cannot substitute for an answer to economic frustration. To me, this looks like a president retreating into projects that satisfy his ego while voters ask what his administration has done for them.

The Midterm Curse

The scale of the defeat matters, but a setback for the president’s party should not surprise anyone familiar with American politics. Midterms repeatedly expose the gap between the coalition that elects a president and the electorate willing to support his party two years later.

Robert S. Erikson examined this pattern in “The Puzzle of Midterm Loss”. He assessed explanations including presidential coattails, changes in turnout and a referendum on presidential performance. His central finding favoured a “presidential penalty”: the party in power tended to suffer simply because it held the presidency, beyond what economic conditions and presidential popularity alone could explain.

That does not make voters’ particular grievances irrelevant. It means those grievances operate within a political system that regularly encourages a check on presidential power. Some voters oppose the president outright. Others are disappointed with his performance or prefer divided government. These motivations can overlap rather than forming three separate electoral camps.

In my view, that combination helps explain the Republican result. Trump faced both the familiar disadvantages of incumbency and dissatisfaction with decisions for which his administration must answer. Historical patterns provide context, not an excuse.

Nor should Republicans assume that losing Congress proves the electorate has embraced everything the Democrats represent. A vote against the party in power can be a demand for restraint, accountability or better performance. What the winners do with that opportunity will matter as much as the campaign that brought them to office.

Two Years of Political Warfare

It is premature to declare Trump politically finished. Losing Congress will limit his legislative ambitions and expose his administration to more aggressive scrutiny, but it will also give him an opponent against which to organise his supporters. Few politicians are more comfortable making confrontation the centre of public life.

Trump has repeatedly turned political setbacks into arguments about hostile institutions, media bias and the conduct of his opponents. He will try to do so again. Republicans should nevertheless distinguish between a strategy that energises their existing supporters and one that wins back voters who have just rejected them.

I expect the incoming Democratic majority to confront the administration forcefully. In my view, Republicans would be mistaken to assume that the party’s more radical and woke currents will moderate simply because it has regained congressional power. Investigations, spending disputes and legislative battles could dominate the final two years of Trump’s presidency. He will have opportunities to portray that opposition as obstruction, but he will still need to explain his own record.

Impeachment is a possibility, although it must be distinguished from removal. The House can approve articles of impeachment by a simple majority; conviction and removal require the support of two thirds of senators present. A Democratic majority therefore makes impeachment possible without making removal likely. Conviction would require substantial Republican support.

The Republicans’ larger problem extends beyond Trump’s remaining time in office. They must eventually choose a successor and persuade voters that the party can deliver more than permanent conflict. The next presidential campaign will be shaped by whether they learn from this defeat or explain it away.

Trump knows how to fight a hostile Congress. What Republicans now need to discover is whether he can answer the voters who put it there.