The Deal Is Dead
After weeks of back-and-forth negotiations, it appeared some kind of deal was in the works between the United States and Iran. That all fell apart after an Iranian attack on a ship transiting the Strait of Hormuz. This led to another round of US air strikes on Iran, ending the ceasefire.
While Trump wants to put a permanent end to Iran's nuclear programme, an air campaign is unlikely to achieve that goal on its own. Military strikes can delay Iran's nuclear programme. They cannot eliminate the ideology driving it.Thankfully, one of Trump's predecessors offers a path forward that doesn't involve US ground troops: Thomas Jefferson.
More than three months into the conflict, we are no closer to a resolution. President Trump said he would make a final decision on whether to reach a deal with Iran. This is despite repeated Iranian violations of the ceasefire through missile and drone attacks on its neighbours. Iran has also shown no willingness to compromise on any of the key issues, including its nuclear programme and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran's most recent attack is not the first time the Mullahs have violated the ceasefire, but it is the one that convinced Trump negotiations have failed.
The Iranian government insists that its control over the Strait be recognised in any deal with the United States. This cannot happen, not only because it is an international waterway, but because of the dangerous precedent it would set for other bad actors.
Bombs Aren't Enough
The intransigence of the Iranians is causing fears that Trump could ultimately sign something resembling Obama's JCPOA.
Iran's negotiating playbook is simple: refuse to compromise enough times and eventually Western negotiators convince themselves that delaying the problem is the best available outcome. The result is a deal that allows Iran's nuclear programme to survive until the politicians who negotiated it have left office.
Trump has argued for decades that Iran cannot be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon. A JCPOA 2.0 would contradict one of the President's longest-held beliefs. He cannot agree to a deal that merely gives Iran's nuclear programme a new lease of life.
Iran Only Understands Power
Iran's control of the Strait cannot be recognised in an international treaty. Doing so would not only disrupt global trade but also encourage other hostile states to pursue similar claims over strategic waterways.
Regardless of whatever deal is signed with Iran, the Islamic Republic's word is worth no more than the paper it is written on. Its negotiating tactics reflect that reality. During the Obama administration: refuse to compromise until the other side eventually accepts most of their demands. Their insistence on preserving their nuclear programme suggests they remain committed to eventually acquiring a nuclear weapon.
For the Mullahs, this is not merely a diplomatic issue, it is an ideological one. They believe they are doing Allah's work and no amount of persuasion by the "Great Satan" is going to convince them otherwise.
Jefferson Already Solved This
Given that the Iranian government remains committed to developing a nuclear weapon, the Trump administration would be wise to reconsider regime change. While the phrase became politically toxic after Iraq, it may be the only realistic path forward if Iran refuses to abandon its nuclear ambitions.
Fortunately, Trump may not need an Iraq-style invasion involving hundreds of thousands of American troops. If diplomacy cannot solve the problem and air power cannot finish it, Washington needs another source of leverage. For inspiration, he should instead look to another President: Thomas Jefferson.
In the early years of the American republic, one of the country's greatest foreign policy challenges came from the Barbary Pirates. The Barbary States raided merchant shipping throughout the Mediterranean and demanded tribute from foreign nations. While many countries chose to buy them off, the fledgling United States could not afford their demands.
America ultimately defeated the Barbary States during the First Barbary War, thanks largely to the efforts of the United States Marine Corps, resulting in a treaty with Tripoli.
However, events could easily have taken a different course. Before that treaty was signed, Jefferson quietly backed a coup led by the Pasha of Tripoli's brother, potentially making him the first American president to pursue regime change in the Middle East.
Back the Revolution
The coup never happened. It didn't have to. The mere threat of American support for regime change helped bring the Pasha to the negotiating table. Trump could follow the same blueprint with Iran.
It may seem like years ago, but only months have passed since millions of Iranians filled the streets in protest against the Islamic Republic. The Department of Defense could begin arming Iranian opposition groups to challenge the regime.
Another step would be to elevate a potential leader of such a movement. Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi could become that figure. Publicly recognising Pahlavi would legitimise him as a potential leader of a post-Islamic Republic Iran. Even if he lacks majority support today, elevating him would send a clear signal to the Mullahs that Trump is serious about regime change.
No More Empty Threats
Arming a revolution against the Islamic Republic may not succeed. It doesn't have to. All that matters is that the Iranian leadership believes Trump is serious about supporting one. Simply threatening regime change is no longer enough. Washington has to demonstrate that it is prepared to back it. Either Iran gives the United States what it wants on the Strait of Hormuz and permanently abandons its nuclear ambitions, or America openly supports a government that will.
Trump doesn't want to continue the war with Iran. But neither does he want Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. Fortunately, Thomas Jefferson's example offers an alternative. By credibly threatening to support internal regime change, Trump may be able to force the Iranian regime to make concessions, or ultimately bring about a government that will.
