Trump’s new Latin America strategy is here: targeting Venezuela, cracking down on cartels, and countering China’s influence, what does it mean for the region?
Erik Suarez
Aug 20, 2025 - 7:00 PM
Share
A few months ago, I wrote an oped for Visegrad24 making a case for the United States to designate Venezuela as an international sponsor of terrorism. Well, the Trump administration under Secretary Rubio apparently read my piece, or at least reached the same conclusion. Now that the U.S. has taken that step, the bigger question is: what happens next?
While there’s no crystal ball for U.S. foreign policy, examining Trump’s past actions in the region, his approach to foreign threats, and the administration’s key security and diplomatic priorities allows us to make some educated guesses about what this “New Trump Doctrine” might, and should, look like.
The new Trump Doctrine blends elements of the Truman and Monroe Doctrines. Instead of confronting communism, it targets narco-states and cartels that quietly threaten the U.S., while backing nations that share its security interests in Latin America. Achieving this requires a strategy as robust diplomatically as it is militarily, building alliances to confront a common threat, currently embodied by Venezuela.
This month, the administration raised the reward for the heads of Nicolás Maduro and his associates to historic levels, designated the “Cartel de los Soles” as an international terrorist group, and deployed military vessels into the Caribbean to target drug trafficking groups. These actions follow a New York Times report revealing a directive allowing the military to conduct operations in Latin America targeting drug cartels, both at sea and on land. At this moment, three U.S. destroyers are sailing towards Venezuela. Press Secretary Leavitt stated that:
“President Trump… is prepared to use every element of American power to stop drugs from flooding into our country… the Maduro regime is not a legitimate government.”
These measures show that the administration is prioritizing security in Latin America, making it a central focus of U.S. foreign policy for the first time in decades. Balancing the intensity of military operations with avoiding interstate conflict will, however, be a challenge.
Diplomatically, the administration has also taken steps. A recent joint statement with Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, Panamá, Paraguay, and Perú condemned “Tren de Aragua” as an international terrorist organization. Ecuador further joined the U.S. in designating the “Cartel de los Soles” as a terrorist group. This demonstrates that the U.S. is securing regional allies to advance its objectives.
Trump avoids wars that risk American lives, as promised during his campaign, but he does not hesitate to confront enemies he deems dangerous. His handling of recent actions against Iran’s nuclear program is a case in point. Considering the administration’s focus on fentanyl and cartel activity at the border, along with Rubio’s longstanding opposition to the Venezuelan Socialist regime, this is clearly a high-priority issue.
The most effective strategy would involve security alliances with multiple Latin American countries and access to regions affected by drug trafficking in the Caribbean and Amazon. These partnerships could include military and police training programs, investment in infrastructure, economic cooperation, and joint operations. Such coordination would limit the operations of the “Cartel de los Soles” and other groups like FARC and ELN, reducing drug inflows to the U.S., stabilizing the region, and potentially ending the Venezuelan regime.
These developments could also address another major security concern: China. Peru provides a real-world example of significant Chinese investment, including the Chancay Port project, the third-largest port in Latin America, while also facing challenges from Venezuelan gangs. This combination illustrates why a country like Peru could be a prime candidate for the type of U.S. engagement proposed here. Aligning with countries like this could strengthen diplomatic, economic, and security ties with the U.S. while limiting Chinese influence. Chile, Ecuador, Colombia, and Brazil could follow a similar approach by proactively partnering with the U.S. to enhance regional stability and counter both criminal networks and foreign influence.
As the U.S. moves from observer to active participant in Latin America, the challenge will be balancing hard power with diplomacy, and tackling narco-states without triggering full-blown conflicts. If done right, this approach could stabilize the region, curb the influence of cartels, and maybe even make the phrase “Trump Doctrine” less of a punchline and more of a policy reality.
One thing is certain: Venezuela is no longer just a distant headline; it’s a front in the broader struggle for security, influence, and regional stability.
Share
Erik Suarez
Economist | Policy Analyst