Three Camps, Three Visions
As 2025 drew to a close, I began investigating what 2026 would look like for Europe. Like many, I started with the broader realignment few remember we are living through. 2024 was an election year, Trump’s return dominated headlines, but we are entering a deeper era of transformation. Europe is caught between cohesion and fragmentation, pride and pragmatism, pluralism and the urgent need for a strategic vision.
At Davos, global negotiations unfolded in real time. Declarations often conflicted, world leaders flooded our streams with noise and bullet points, and expert panels like Politico’s 2026 roundtable attempted to make sense of it. For Europeans, understanding these debates isn’t academic, it’s survival.
Across discussions, three distinct camps emerged, each using the same words- “middle power,” “strategic autonomy,” “resilience” - to describe incompatible futures.
1. The Institutionalists: Selling Old Wine in New Bottles
In Washington and Brussels think tanks, urgent whispers about “middle power cooperation” dominate. These voices are closely tied to U.S. foreign aid: Carnegie, Brookings, the Atlantic Council, and Harvard’s Kennedy School collectively receive tens of millions in USAID and State Department funding. Their survival depends on convincing Congress that “middle power” frameworks can replace the globalization projects now being dismantled.
When Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs shattered the WTO-centered order, these institutions faced an existential crisis. Their solution? Rebrand. “Global governance” became “regional resilience.” “Democracy promotion” became “strategic autonomy.” The vocabulary changed; the funding pitch persisted.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s Davos call for middle powers to “act together” against American overreach illustrates this. Figures like Harvard’s Meghan O’Sullivan reject outright confrontation with the U.S., arguing that middle power coalitions cannot defy Washington. For Europeans, the Institutionalists offer familiarity and comfort: transatlantic coordination, liberal values, and multilateral process. But this is a Potemkin village. Daniel Fried, former State Department official, calls their strategy a “theological hope” that America will eventually “return from its current fall”, not a plan. Meanwhile, Europe waits.
2. The Autonomists: Desperate for a Lifeboat
If the Institutionalists are protecting their business model, the Autonomists are trying to save their countries. Former Ukrainian politician Aliona Hlivco warns: Europe must “stand on its own two feet,” especially on security. Roland Paris proposes three pillars: diversify trade, expand military capacity, and develop durable coordination among U.S.-allied “orphans.” Berlin’s Thorsten Benner calls for “unglamorous hard work” to reduce dependencies on both Washington and Beijing.
This camp is less tethered to U.S. funding, allowing clearer sightlines to reality: the American security umbrella is retracting, and Europe is unprepared. Trump’s December 2025 National Security Strategy is not a deviation; it’s a structural shift. The Monroe Doctrine revival, economic détente with China, and explicit demand that Europe assume primary responsibility for its defense indicate a long-term plan.
Hungarian analyst Attila Demkó warns: “The world of overwhelming Western power is over. China alone produces more industrial goods than all NATO members combined.” He notes that Canada has 74 main battle tanks, roughly equal to Hungarian land forces, emphasizing that rearmament is hard work, not Davos speeches.
Europe’s Autonomists face painful truths: fragmentation isn’t Trump’s fault alone. Germany’s government collapsed in 2025; France faces fiscal constraints; the UK continues post-Brexit adjustments. Their call for “strategic autonomy” is emergency triage, not preference. The risk: urgency can slide into blame-shifting, but the Autonomists’ insights remain clear-eyed.
3. The Sovereigntists: Playing a Different Game
Sovereigntists reject middle power fantasies. Justin Logan (Cato Institute) notes: “Middle power cooperation will remain constrained by great power hierarchies.” His institution opposes foreign aid, giving it independence to call the “middle power” conversation institutional theater.
Former Republican Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison defends Trump’s tariff strategy, criticizes European digital taxes, and warns that reaching out to China risks violating NATO-aligned policy. Indian strategist C. Raja Mohan and Turkish analyst Sinan Ulgen emphasize national priorities over Atlanticist frameworks. Mohan notes most middle powers sought bilateral deals rather than challenge the U.S.; Ulgen highlights Turkey’s tough position between NATO and EU.
The Sovereigntists understand what others obscure: Trump’s order isn’t chaos, it’s hierarchy. U.S.-led interventions, from Venezuela to Kazakhstan, bilateral trade deals, and Abraham Accords expansion, create a hub-and-spoke system, where compliant partners are rewarded and competitors isolated.
British historian Sumantra Maitra’s proposals (CANZUK, EU military integration) exemplify the camp’s logic: accept a hierarchical world and negotiate regionally, even if it limits global ambition.
The European Crossroads
Europe now faces three options:
Institutionalist path: Bet on American return, maintain existing structures, spend more on defense, wait for 2028 or beyond. Risk: permanent misalignment if Trumpism endures.
Autonomist path: Build genuine self-sufficiency through political integration and capabilities. Risk: internal fragmentation under pressure.
Sovereigntist path: Accept U.S. hierarchy, pursue bilateral deals and regional consolidation. Risk: become subordinate in a U.S.-centered system.
At Davos 2026, confusion stemmed from these camps talking past each other. Mark Carney’s call for middle power solidarity was heard differently: Institutionalists saw funding, Autonomists saw a lifeline, Sovereigntists saw fantasy.
Seven Trends Shaping Europe in 2026
- AI Integration Race: Europe’s “human-centric AI” approach may become a competitive advantage; China’s chip deficit could determine inclusion or exclusion from global tech.
- Critical Minerals as the New Oil: China’s rare earth dominance forces hard choices; U.S.-China deals expose Europe’s vulnerability.
- Capability Crisis: Ukraine requires €100 billion annually; Germany, France, and UK constraints test Europe’s strategic autonomy.
- Nuclear Arms Control Vacuum: New START expires February 2026; European security relies on extended deterrence while America pivots.
- Abraham Accords Transformation: Now a U.S.-led regional economic and diplomatic wall, limiting European influence.
- Water and Tech Collisions: Semiconductor cooling and agriculture demand collide in Germany and Netherlands, forcing regional prioritization.
- Humanitarian Pressures: U.S. aid cuts, strained European budgets, and climate displacement risk migration crises that test cohesion.
Finding Solid Ground
The “middle power” concept promised stability between giants. In 2026, it’s a mirage. Europe’s choice is between three architectures: Managed dependence (Institutionalist); Uncertain autonomy (Autonomist); Hierarchical integration (Sovereigntist).
Europe must decide while fragmented. The Institutionalists offer comfortable delay, the Autonomists necessary but painful transformation, the Sovereigntists clarity at the cost of ambition.
As U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said at Davos: “Globalisation has failed the West.” The experts responding spoke from positions shaped by funding, national interest, and ideology, not neutral ground.
Europe’s task isn’t finding the “right” camp. It’s building coherence despite the noise. Middle power debates were distractions; the real question is whether Europe can act as a cohesive, capable second global power, capable of deterrence, growth, and a voice in a restructured world order.
Dre Lapiello
Independent Researcher | Broker
