As someone who usually focuses on the complexities of the Middle East, I find myself drawn to Europe’s role in Ukraine’s ongoing struggle. With the war entering its fourth year, the strategic landscape around us is shifting. The United States, under the Trump administration, appears to be exploring a different path, possibly stepping back from its position as Kyiv’s main supporter through negotiations that could reduce American involvement.
For Europe, this moment presents both a challenge and an opportunity: to assume real leadership in supporting Ukraine’s resilience against Russia’s accelerating military pressure. Doing so is not only morally right. It is essential to Europe’s own security. A stable, sovereign Ukraine is one of the most effective buffers for NATO and the EU against Russian aggression.
Below is a clearer look at what Europe has done, where gaps remain, and how we might move faster, standing firmly on our own feet, without excessive reliance on Washington.
Ammunition: Building Capacity Amid Challenges
Europe’s ammunition initiatives have meaningfully expanded production, yet still fall short of Ukraine’s battlefield requirements. The EU’s Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) aims to reach roughly 2 million rounds per year by end-2025, backed by €3.3 billion from the European Peace Facility. Germany has become a central hub for shell and drone production, while France and the UK contribute systems such as SAMP/T air defense and Storm Shadow missiles. Smaller partners, including Norway and Belgium, add financing for replenishment.
But bottlenecks - like shortages of key explosives such as Polish TNT - slow output. With Russia producing ammunition at scale and generating around 35,000 Shahed drones annually, Europe risks remaining behind the curve.
Realistically, Ukraine needs 2–3 million shells annually, alongside far greater stocks of air-defense interceptors. Europe could meet that level only by accelerating industrial partnerships with Ukrainian firms and expanding TNT and powder production across Central Europe.
For readers in Central Europe, this is not abstract: it shapes border security, industrial investment, and our ability to deter threats close to home.
Equipment: Strengthening the Front Lines
When it comes to equipment, Europe’s efforts are substantial but uneven. Since 2022, Germany alone has delivered over €21 billion in military support, from tanks to armored vehicles. The UK follows with roughly £12.8 billion in high-end systems. EU-wide support through the European Peace Facility totals €11.1 billion, including Patriots, air-defense systems, and armored platforms. The Netherlands and Denmark have led the coalition supplying F-16s and strengthening Ukraine’s air defenses.
Yet, even with these contributions, Ukraine still receives only about half of what it needs to hold lines or regain territory. Russia, investing heavily in its war economy, continues to outproduce Europe in drones, missiles, and armored vehicles.
Cross-border logistics remain a persistent problem: slow rail corridors, limited heavy-equipment routes, and inconsistent standards cause delays that translate to battlefield vulnerability. With Russia advancing an estimated 440 square kilometers per month, time is not on Ukraine’s side.
Personnel: Preparing the People
Europe has excelled in one area: training. The EU Military Assistance Mission has trained over 81,000 Ukrainian soldiers, with 15,000 more planned soon, and discussions underway about conducting some training inside Ukraine itself. NATO’s collective exercises, such as this year’s drills involving 30,000 troops, add depth to this effort, while Poland and Romania host major training hubs.
Yet Ukraine fields a massive force of 2.2 million personnel, facing significant attrition. Europe’s current training numbers represent only 20–30% of the annual reinforcement pipeline Ukraine needs for a prolonged defensive war.
If European training capacity expanded to 100,000–120,000 troops per year, paired with simulation systems and shorter rotation cycles, it could make a decisive impact on Ukraine’s resilience. At the same time, with 69% of Ukrainians open to faster peace talks, Europe must consider how military training supports not just battlefield survival but also credible diplomacy.
How Europe Can Accelerate Support
To reduce dependence on U.S. political cycles and bolster European sovereignty, the EU could take several accelerated steps:
Expand Ammunition Production
- Increase funding beyond ASAP’s €500 million and triple production by 2026–27.
- Consider new investments alongside current developments in Sweden, particularly new TNT and powder plants, especially in Poland, Slovakia, and the Baltics.
- Harmonise procurement rules under the European Defence Industrial Strategy to lift output by 20–30%.
- Leverage Ukraine’s fast-moving manufacturing sector to reach 3–4 million shells annually.
Strengthen Equipment Supply Chains
- Expand the European Peace Facility to enable targeted procurement of what Ukraine prioritises: mine-clearing systems, armored vehicles, air-defense interceptors.
- Coordinate joint drone and missile manufacturing, reducing costs 30–40%.
- Invest €1–2 billion in European logistics corridors - rail, bridges, depots - to speed delivery.
Boost Training & Readiness
- Scale the EU training mission to over 100,000 troops annually.
- Introduce on-site training in secure regions of western Ukraine.
- Expand NATO rapid-reaction elements to reinforce eastern frontiers and integrate Ukrainian officers into planning cycles.
Altogether, fresh, coordinated pledges of €50–100 billion could double the speed of support and signal a new era of European strategic responsibility.
The European Parliament’s Role
In Brussels, momentum is building. A broad coalition, from the European People’s Party (EPP) to the Socialists & Democrats (S&D), Renew Europe, the Greens/EFA, and the ECR, has consistently called for stronger, faster, and more reliable military aid to Ukraine. These groups recognise that supporting Kyiv is not charity; it is Europe’s security policy in action.
The Left questions heavy militarisation, and Identity & Democracy often takes a divergent line, but the centre-right, liberals, greens, and pro-NATO conservatives collectively hold enough weight to drive a more confident European policy.
If these parliamentary blocs act together, the EU can move from supportive partner to strategic guarantor, bringing stability to Ukraine and strengthening Europe’s own capacity to defend itself in a rapidly changing world.
Dre Lapiello
Independent Researcher | Broker
