A Regime at Breaking Point
With the United States and Israel dismantling the Islamic Republic’s military and leadership, and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei now dead, Iran has entered a historic rupture. What once seemed a distant possibility is unfolding in real time. The regime’s coercive core has been broken from above after years of eroding legitimacy from below. As military operations continue and internal fractures widen, the prospect of Iranians taking to the streets to reclaim their country is no longer speculative.
For Europe, this is not a crisis to manage with statements and delay. It is a defining strategic moment that will determine whether Europe helps shape Iran’s transition, or once again reacts to events it chose not to influence.
The Islamic Republic is at its weakest point since 1979. Domestically, it has lost political legitimacy; economically, it is failing to deliver; ideologically, it has shown no capacity for revision. Since the nationwide uprising of December 2017, Iran has experienced four major waves of mass protest. Each has been broader, more radical, and more explicitly anti-regime than the last.
These uprisings were not episodic reactions to hardship but cumulative rejections of a political system fundamentally misaligned with Iranian society. This record leaves little room for ambiguity: reform from within is neither realistic nor forthcoming. The long-standing European hope of identifying “reasonable” actors inside the system has been overtaken by events.
The Cost of Inaction for Europe
This reality matters directly for Europe. A regime that cannot stabilize internally exports pressure externally. If the status quo persists, Europe will face a significant new wave of Iranian asylum seekers driven by economic collapse and political suffocation rather than war. European migration systems, already under strain, will bear the cost of inaction. Aligning policy with the demands of the Iranian people is therefore not an act of moral symbolism; it is preventative governance.
The economic argument for restraint has also collapsed. Europe’s trade with Iran has shrunk to marginal levels that offer no strategic upside while exposing European firms to legal, compliance, and reputational risk. With sanctions tightening and the activation of snapback mechanism, the idea that Europe is preserving meaningful economic interests by accommodating Tehran no longer holds. In fact, Tehran itself has no interest in relying on Europe, given its track record after the failure of the nuclear deal. For Brussels, the familiar trade-off between values and prosperity has disappeared; Europe will not get a significant share of the Iranian market while the regime is in place, which is reserved for Beijing.
At the same time, a post-regime Iran would represent a major opportunity for Europe’s energy security. Iran holds one of the world’s largest oil and gas reserves, currently locked behind ideology and isolation. In a post-Islamic Republic scenario, Iran could become a reliable contributor to diversified energy supply at a moment when Europe is urgently reducing dependence on Russia. Supporting Iran’s transition is therefore aligned with Europe’s long-term economic resilience.
A Growing Security and Strategic Threat
Security considerations reinforce the same conclusion. The Islamic Republic is not a distant authoritarian problem; it is an active threat on European soil. Iranian intelligence services and the IRGC have repeatedly used Europe for surveillance, intimidation, and assassination plots, often through criminal intermediaries and religious cover networks. This behavior directly undermines European sovereignty. A future Iranian state aligned with its population could dismantle these networks rather than export repression into Europe.
Iran’s role in enabling Russia’s war against Ukraine further elevates the stakes. Tehran’s provision of drones and missile-related capabilities has prolonged a conflict that threatens European security, unity, and economic stability. As long as the current regime remains in power, this strategic alignment with Moscow will persist. Weakening Tehran’s capacity is inseparable from Europe’s broader response to Russian aggression.
Europe must also confront the moral dimension it has often ignored. The Islamic Republic has carried out one of the largest and most violent crackdowns on protesters in modern history, massacring over 36,500 protestors in two days. Tens of thousands have been imprisoned, or tortured. In the shadow of the legacy of Bosnia and Kosovo, Europe faces a familiar test: whether it acts when mass repression is underway or explains later why caution felt safer at the time.
Regionally, Tehran’s proxy warfare continues to destabilize the Middle East, disrupt trade routes, threaten Europe’s partners, and inflate insurance and transportation costs across vital corridors. Stability and economic expansion in the region are incompatible with a regime whose influence is built on permanent disruption.
A Strategic Moment Europe Cannot Miss
The looming prospect of military confrontation has changed the strategic equation. The United States and Israel are actively confronting Tehran over its nuclear program, missile capabilities, regional aggression, and internal repression. Europe is not a bystander. As demonstrated previously, European air and missile defense assets have already contributed to intercepting Iranian drones and missiles. In any future conflict, Europe will be part of the security environment whether it chooses to be or not.
This is why Europe must move beyond managing the Islamic Republic and begin preparing for what comes after. That includes serious engagement with the political alternative Iranians themselves have elevated. Protesters across Iran have repeatedly invoked Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, who has articulated a clear vision, the Iran Prosperity Project, for a democratic, secular Iran committed to territorial integrity and international cooperation. Coordination with credible opposition leadership is not ideological alignment; it is strategic foresight.
Europe’s long-term security and economic interests point in the same direction: preparing for change in Iran. The cost of waiting may appear lower in the short term, but it will be higher when the opportunity to influence outcomes has passed.
