The Return of the Realists
America, Israel, and Iran are navigating a precarious and already tumultuous ceasefire in their 2026 war. Initial waves of decisive action against nuclear sites, leadership targets, and military infrastructure have already given way to pauses, negotiations, and “de-escalation”, with the momentum for genuine regime change appearing to be fading in Western circles.
Early rhetoric from Washington DC and Jerusalem spoke boldly of empowering the Iranian people to seize their future. Now, the same kinds of “realist” voices that sought appeasement with Nazi Germany, allowed the creation of North Korea by restraining Douglas MacArthur, and tolerated the buildup of the Islamic Regime’s missile and terror capabilities, are coming again to dominate: there is “no clear opposition leader”, no ready formation to pay off the risks of regime change.
The “Only 30%” Problem
Above all, critics repeatedly dismiss Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi with the ubiquitous claim that he “only” has about 30% support among Iranians. This self-defeating counsel of perfection risks perpetuating tyranny through a nonsensical demand for consensus amidst the fragmentation of a collapsing autocracy.
A committed plurality, especially one that is explicitly transitional and referendum-oriented, provides a firmer practical foundation than critics admit, particularly when the regime’s own legitimacy has collapsed far more dramatically. In the GAMAAN June 2024 poll of over 77,000 respondents inside Iran, 31.4% selected Reza Pahlavi as a first or second choice for leadership in a post-regime scenario. He led every other named opposition figure by a wide margin. Toomaj Salehi sat at some 6%, and Narges Mohammadi at some 5%.
Support forms a stable plurality. Roughly one-third are strong backers of Pahlavi, one-third strong opponents, and the rest are moderates or undecided, with surges visible in protest chants of “Long Live the King” (Javid Shah). This is not fringe enthusiasm but the broadest possible base one could reasonably expect for any single opposition voice in a deeply complex landscape.
Popularity Politics
Dismissing that as insufficient because it falls short of a majority distorts how politics works in reality, both in the Middle East and in functional democracies.
In that part of the world, where autocracies have long proven stable despite lacking genuine mass consent, leaders rarely command anything resembling democratic majorities. Power rests on elite networks, coercion, and partisan apathy far more than popular approval. To demand that an opposition figure in exile muster majority enthusiasm before the regime even falls is to set a standard no challenger to entrenched tyranny could ever meet.
The parallel in the West is even more instructive. In established democracies with often dismal voter turnout, governments routinely form and govern with support from well under half the population. American presidents are elected with turnout around 55-66%, meaning the winner frequently secures the votes of just 25-35% of the voting-age population. Many European parliamentary systems see similar or lower participation, with coalition governments cobbled together from parties polling 20-40%.
In my native South Africa, often hailed for its robust “miracle democracy”, in the 2024 election turnout hovered near 59% of registered voters. The leading African National Congress (ANC) took about 40% of votes cast, translating to roughly 23-25% of registered voters and far less of the eligible population. And yet the ANC formed a Government of National Unity and installed its president without legitimacy being questioned on numerical grounds alone.
These systems are legitimate not because they enjoy ecstatic majority enthusiasm from every citizen, but because they operate under accepted procedural rules that allow pluralities and coalitions to channel public will into stable governance. Why apply a harsher, majority-or-nothing test to a transitional figure in Iran where the stakes are escaping theocratic totalitarianism, rather than rotating power in a mature democracy?
The asymmetry is glaring. GAMAAN surveys consistently show around 70% of Iranians rejecting continuation of the Islamic Republic in a free referendum, with peaks near 81% during protest waves and only about 20% actively wanting the current system to remain.
Nearly 89% express support for a democratic system in principle. The regime’s legitimacy has eroded far more deeply than any supposed shortfall in Pahlavi’s appeal. He holds a clear plurality among fragmented opposition voices – republicans, leftists, liberals, and ethnic groups – while benefiting from symbolic continuity with pre-1979 Iran’s relative secularism and modernisation.
Perfection is the Enemy of Good
None of this, of course, erases history. The Pahlavi dynasty had dirty, bloody hands: repression by SAVAK (Pahlavian secret police) among other authoritarian excesses and human rights failures under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and earlier generations demand honest acknowledgment.
But Reza Pahlavi is neither his father nor his grandfather. Reared and educated in the West, he has spent decades articulating liberal democratic commitments – secularism, individual rights, territorial integrity, and free expression – without claiming some divine right to rule or hereditary entitlement. He has repeatedly and explicitly framed any role he might have as transitional: overseeing a countrywide referendum on the future system (monarchy or republic), shepherding a constitutional assembly, and stepping aside for elected institutions. Pahlavi positions himself as a neutral arbiter and bridge, not an autocrat-in-waiting.
There is no doubt that he, too, will have his excesses just like any other politician. Certainly. But his record gives no indication of intent to impose new tyranny. Iranians, who are largely secular in aspiration and weary of theocratic suffocation, deserve the chance to test this in an open, free context, not have their prospects dismissed because Western observers apply a bafflingly unrealistic benchmark.
The scoffing at “mere” 30% is opportunistic and self-defeating. In low-trust, post-authoritarian settings, transitions rarely begin with sweeping majorities. They succeed (or fail) through motivated pluralities that can broker coalitions, prevent chaos, and deliver credible processes. Eastern Europe’s post-communist shifts, Latin American democratisations, and other cases show that a committed base like Pahlavi’s, combined with name recognition and diaspora networks, could well provide the necessary anchor.
A Rare Opening
This moment is rare. I am not Reza Pahlavi fanboy – my interest is exclusively with the liberty of the people of Iran. The worry is that those with the power to effect change are selling out this prospect of freedom by gaslighting the world about how popular politics works. The people of Iran should not be betrayed because Pahlavi is not “popular enough” yet – he is plenty popular for the purposes of this endeavour.
The Islamic Republic’s fractures, exposed further by the 2025-2026 strikes, leadership losses, and ongoing protests, have created a once-in-a-generation strategic opening. A free, secular Iran would be a moral triumph: the right of a people to self-determination without the boot of ideology on their necks.
It would also deliver immense strategic gains for the West, by ending the constant, implicit nuclear threat, religiously motivated proxy terrorism, Tehran’s “economic veto” over the Strait of Hormuz; and replacing “Death to America” with a potential ally in a fraught region of the world. If the regime is not brought down, America and Israel would have an even tougher time in the future mustering sympathy for the perfectly foreseeable and inevitable civilian-targeted terror attacks like 7 October 2023 that are sure to follow.
Demanding perfection now risks squandering that opportunity. Applying a strict “majority-or-nothing” test to opposition figures in a collapsing autocracy is unrealistic and risks perpetuating tyranny by demanding perfection amid fragmentation. A committed plurality, especially one explicitly transitional and referendum-oriented, provides a firmer practical foundation than opportunistic critics admit, particularly when the regime’s own legitimacy collapse is steeper.
Western policymakers should see Reza Pahlavi’s 30%+ base not as disqualification, but as a very solid starting point: a foundation upon which coalitions can form, a referendum can legitimise the path forward, and Iranians can finally build the free society they have bled for. The alternative – vacillation, half-measures, or leaving a rump regime in place – is not prudent and would obviously amount to a quiet betrayal of both Iranian aspirations and long-term Western security interests.
History will judge whether we seized this chance at this moment or whether the moral and strategic decline of the West that started decades ago will simply continue apace.
