A leaked US-brokered peace framework reveals the harsh new geometry of power: Ukraine is exhausted, Europe is fragmented, and Russia’s war machine is grinding forward.
Dre Lapiello
Nov 28, 2025 - 3:37 PM
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Harsh Calculus
The leaked 28-point peace framework brokered by the United States, reportedly shaped with input from envoy Steve Witkoff and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, appears to reflect terms the Kremlin can live with. And it exposes a grim strategic reality:
- Ukraine is drifting into deeper military and diplomatic isolation as the war grinds into its fourth year.
- Europe lacks both the military weight to shift the battlefield and the economic leverage Washington can apply to Moscow.
- The plan requires major Ukrainian concessions: formal recognition of Russian control over most of Donbas and Crimea; a constitutional prohibition on NATO membership; and a strict ceiling of 600,000 personnel for Ukraine’s armed forces. In return, Washington offers narrowly defined security guarantees, reconstruction funds drawn from frozen Russian assets, and a demilitarised buffer zone intended to stop the slow-motion destruction along the front.
Kyiv and several European capitals reacted with fury, denouncing the proposal as a betrayal. Social media exploded with condemnation, framing the deal as a coerced capitulation. But behind the moral outrage lies an unforgiving strategic truth: Ukraine’s manpower is depleted; its military stretched; Western support, though immense, is under pressure amid multiple global crises. Meanwhile, for all its dysfunction, Russia has rebuilt and expanded its defence-industrial base, sustaining a long war far more effectively than many expected.
None of this amounts to appeasing Moscow. Russia’s invasion remains illegal, brutal, and indefensible. But prolonging the war without a realistic path to altering the battlefield geometry risks only further Ukrainian losses, without changing the underlying strategic equation.
Early Optimism to Brutal Realism
In 2022, early Ukrainian successes near Kyiv and Kharkiv fuelled hopes of reversing Russian advances and securing swift strategic gains. These victories, paired with the failed Istanbul talks, raised expectations for a conflict that might be resolved sooner rather than later.
However, by 2025, Russia’s defence industry had rebounded impressively, producing between 250 and 300 T-90M tanks annually, alongside refurbished Soviet-era stocks — surpassing several Western European nations in production rates (National Security Journal, Army Recognition, Oct 2025). Analyst Michael Kofman noted that Russia’s adaptation exceeded many forecasts, especially its ability to maintain a steady supply of materiel despite sanctions.
The framework implicitly accepts a stalemate: frozen lines marking a battlefield where neither side can achieve decisive breakthroughs with conventional means. Kofman warned in November 2025 that although Russia reduced equipment expenditure in 2024, it would soon face serious manpower pressures as casualties rise.
The Achilles’ Heel
NATO proudly reports all members meeting or exceeding 2% of GDP defence spending in 2025, with intentions to rise to 5% by 2035. Yet the underlying reality is fragmented. Europe’s combined military expenditure, approximately $400–500 billion, produces significantly less combat power than the United States’ $880 billion-plus because of redundant programmes, fractured procurement, and limited integration.
Although European shell production aims to reach 2 million annually by 2025, delivery delays hinder Kyiv’s frontline units. More than €132 billion in military support has been pledged but remains slow to materialise, according to the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker. These delays severely limit Ukraine’s access to essential ammunition for sustained operations.
The US framework’s narrow security guarantees, such as basing F-35s in Poland without extending NATO membership, reflect Washington’s attempt to maintain deterrence while avoiding a direct NATO–Russia confrontation.
Europe, though now delivering more total military aid than the US, still lacks strategic autonomy. Coordinated industrial production to sustain a €250 billion war budget, along with the creation of a unified European force of at least 300,000 troops, remains a long-term aspiration rather than an achievable goal within the next two years.
A Catastrophic Human Toll
The humanitarian cost presents a stark picture. UN-verified civilian deaths exceed 50,000 by late 2025. Ukrainian military casualties, based on rigorous open-source trackers such as UALosses, surpass 160,000 confirmed dead or missing. Russian fatalities are even higher in absolute terms, over 240,000, but Russia’s larger population sustains continued recruitment.
Ukraine faces a severe manpower crisis. The median soldier is now 43 years old. Recruitment gaps, draft evasion, and corruption exacerbate shortfalls. Studies show manpower shortages create cascading operational problems: fewer rotations, rising exhaustion, and declining combat effectiveness. Analyst Rob Lee emphasises how gruelling close-quarters combat exposes these vulnerabilities, with infantry deployed far longer than sustainable.
Russia’s Resilience Fuels Attrition
Contrary to early assessments, Russia’s war machine remains functional and increasingly productive. Despite losing 3,000–4,000 tanks, Moscow offsets losses through ongoing production of advanced T-90Ms and refurbishing older vehicles. SIPRI estimates Russia’s 2025 military spending at $145–149 billion (over 7% of GDP). Analysts like Konrad Muzyka argue that this sustained output allows Russia to secure incremental territorial gains despite enormous human and material costs.
The framework’s one-sided military limits on Ukraine, without reciprocal Russian commitments, rely on sanctions enforcement rather than classical arms-control mechanisms, highlighting the underlying asymmetry.
U.S. Strategic Rebalancing
Since 2022, the United States has provided more than $175 billion in aid to Ukraine, even as new crises erupt across the Middle East, Venezuela, and the Indo-Pacific. The proposed framework partially reallocates US resources, framing reconstruction around more than $100 billion in frozen Russian assets, limiting future American financial exposure.
The scale of U.S. aid:
- Over 2 million 155mm artillery shells
- More than 10,000 Javelin and thousands of other anti-tank systems
- 31 M1 Abrams tanks
- Hundreds of Bradley Fighting Vehicles
- 39 HIMARS launchers and thousands of GMLRS rockets
- Patriot and NASAMS air-defence systems
- Training for 10,000+ Ukrainian troops
- Real-time intelligence support
The strain on U.S. production : Monthly 155mm output has risen from ~14,000 to 40,000–60,000, still short of the 100,000/month target expected only in 2026.
The Inevitable Calculus
The proposed concessions, accepting the status quo in Crimea and Donbas, enforcing a military cap, and codifying a NATO membership ban are unprecedented and deeply painful for Ukraine. Yet alternatives may be worse.
Continued attrition risks collapse or catastrophic losses. Escalation, particularly deeper NATO involvement, could rapidly spiral into regional or global conflict. A delayed defeat could impose even harsher terms later.
Analysts from institutions like the Stimson Center and Quincy Institute note that even an imperfect deal reduces the near-term risk of renewed aggression and creates breathing space to rebuild deterrence. Russian President Vladimir Putin has suggested the framework could “lay the foundation” for peace, while experts like Dara Massicot and Trent Telenko warn that Moscow’s attritional strategy, though costly, remains viable for now.
If the framework materialises, it is not justice. It does not fulfil Ukrainian aspirations or restore pre-war borders. Instead, it may offer a pause, a moment when the brutal arithmetic of war bends principles in order to preserve lives and ensure state survival. It may also create conditions for future reevaluation, when geopolitical, military, or economic realities could better support a lasting settlement or stronger deterrence against renewed aggression.