How Birmingham reveals Britain’s drift from neutrality: when public institutions favor some communities over others.
Steve English
Feb 3, 2026 - 3:00 PM
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This is not a story about one city, one police force, or one football match.
It is about the gradual capture of public institutions by organised identity-based networks - a process that accelerates as demographics shift, electoral incentives change, and authorities increasingly defer to bloc pressure rather than apply rules consistently.
Birmingham matters because it is no longer an outlier. It is a city far enough along this path that the consequences are now difficult to deny.
According to the 2021 Census, Birmingham’s white population fell to 48.6% down from 57.9% in 2011. Nearly 70% of under-16s are non-white, and the Muslim population rose sharply to 29.9% (from 21.8% in 2011). These figures matter because they shape the future electorate, workforce, and institutional pipeline. They are not projections, they are already built into the city’s age structure.
Influence does not require conspiracy. It requires incentives. As demographic composition changes, electoral incentives shift with it. In cities like Birmingham, political success can increasingly depend on mobilising identity-based blocs, particularly where voting patterns and community organisation align around faith, kinship networks, or concentrated neighbourhoods.
Public institutions adapt accordingly. Consultations become selective. “Community leaders” are elevated and legitimised as gatekeepers. Decisions are filtered through fear of backlash, disorder, or accusations of prejudice. Over time, neutrality gives way to risk-management.
This dynamic became visible in November 2025, when Maccabi Tel Aviv supporters were effectively prevented from attending a Europa League match in Birmingham following a Safety Advisory Group process involving West Midlands Police and local authorities.
The supporters were restricted not because they posed a threat, but because authorities judged they could not safely manage hostility directed toward them. The aggressors were not confronted. Police logs and later reviews confirmed credible threats, including masked groups, weapons, and individuals actively searching for people believed to be Jewish.
What this episode exposed is a pattern seen increasingly in public-order policing: when credible threats exist, the state sometimes chooses the path of least resistance, restricting the likely targets rather than decisively confronting the likely source of disorder. That is not neutral policing. It is political risk management.
Identity-based influence does not stop at the ballot box. It also runs through institutions. Formal staff networks and representative bodies exist across public services, including in government and the NHS - part of a wider trend towards institutionalised identity representation.
In principle, staff networks can provide support and improve retention. The question is what happens when representation becomes political leverage, especially when institutions begin treating organised blocs as semi-official partners, and when consultation becomes selective. At that point, the state is no longer mediating between equal citizens. It is managing competing group pressures, and that changes how rules are applied.
The issue here is not private belief. The issue is institutional neutrality: the state cannot remain neutral if it embeds ideological frameworks inside its structures in ways that influence governance, policy, or enforcement. Some belief systems are primarily personal and theological. Others include strong political dimensions in practice - influencing community mobilisation, social regulation, and political demands. When those demands become institutionalised inside public services, neutrality does not merely blur; it can collapse into selective deference.
This is not an argument against anyone’s right to worship. It is a warning about what happens when public institutions become dependent on organised identity power, especially in high-pressure environments like public-order policing and local government.
The Green Lane Mosque case illustrates the risk. Despite a record of controversial speakers, the organisation received more than £2 million in public funding through the Youth Investment Fund, which was later paused after concerns emerged. Close relationships with local authorities, including letters of support from senior police and hosting recruitment events, highlight how proximity can blunt scrutiny.
What happened in Birmingham is not unique. It is structural. The same model is now being reproduced across a growing number of British towns and cities:
Time and again, authorities choose the path of least resistance. Instead of confronting those who threaten disorder, they remove those at risk. Instead of enforcing neutrality, they accommodate pressure. Birmingham is simply further along a road other cities are now travelling.
If football supporters can be restricted “for their own safety,” the problem is not football. If policing communications and intelligence handling collapse into confirmation bias and inflated claims, the problem is not “community cohesion”. If public money flows to organisations that later trigger serious reputational concerns, the problem is not inclusion.
The broader issue is the quiet drift of the state away from equal treatment under the law, and towards selective deference to organised identity power.
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Steve English
Editor